Tax Mimicking and Sub-National Entities : Evidence at the Municipal Level for Montreal, 2000 ? by Gaboury, Geneviève
      
 
 
Rapport de Maîtrise 
 
 
 
Tax mimicking and sub-national entities : 
 
Evidence at the municipal level for Montréal, 2000? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Présenté par  
Geneviève Gaboury 
Gabg23527909 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Université de Montréal 
 
21 octobre 2004 
      
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper tests if there is tax micmicking between municipalities for the urban area of 
Montreal in 2000, two years previous to the merger of some of these municipalities 
examined.  The study uses a regression model (robust ordinary least squares) to estimate 
the impact of demographic or economic variables on tax rates.  The results show that 
there is horizontal interaction between municipalities.  An increase of 10% of the tax rate 
of a neighbouring municipality leads to an increase of almost 4% in its own tax rate for a 
municipality.  Tax mimicking is the most plausible cause for the explanation of these 
results since during the year 2000 there were no common shocks such as an 
environmental catastrophe which would force the local governments to increase taxes.  
Therefore, the local governments mimic the behaviour of their neighbours vis-à-vis the 
tax rate.  
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♦Introduction 
 
The tax behaviour of sub-national entities (SNE) in a federation is an important aspect of 
fiscal behaviour and probably the most important source of irritants, along with direct 
subsidies to attract investments, in intra-country inter-SNE relations. We use sub-national 
entity as a generic name for a province, state, county or municipality within a country 
normally with a local government and a certain degree of autonomy in a varying number 
of matters including taxation.  Tax behaviour will be the focus of this paper; we will 
leave aside subsidies, which are negative taxes and general SNE policies in fields such as 
education, language or welfare that may have an impact on SNE economic attractiveness 
and competitiveness. Tax behaviour has been the subject of both theoretical and, to a 
lesser extent, empirical work by economists in the last twenty years or so.  We will 
examine in particular two tax behaviours; tax competition and tax mimicking.  The first 
one is observed when the entities try to enhance the attractiveness of their jurisdiction, 
thus the entity decrease their taxes and the neighbouring entities must to do the same 
thing, and this is the competition.  Tax mimicking is the behaviour of entities which 
imitate the tax behaviour of their neighbours, thus if an entity increase its tax rate theirs 
neighbours will increase its own tax rate.   Thus, in the first chapter, this paper will draw 
on this existing body of work to examine three issues, each one corresponding to one part 
of the paper.  In the first part we present the main findings of the academic literature on 
tax competition based on theoretical articles and empirical studies on actual behaviour 
and by discussing the “ Tiebout hypothesis ”.  In the second part, we provide the main 
findings of the policy oriented literature towards what is proper SNE behaviour to adopt 
      
 
 
to cope with harmful tax competition.  The third part analyses the diverse view about tax 
competition and what is good or bad about it.  We present also why tax freedom is good 
and we examine what are the consequences of tax competition and how this affects the 
locational decisions of multinational firms. In the second chapter, we will present an 
overview on the property taxation system in Quebec and also we will unveil some 
empirical studies of tax mimicking behaviour and a theoretical analysis of our study.  In 
the third chapter, we will examine the results of an empirical study of the municipalities 
of the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) for the years 1998 to 2000 to ascertain 
if there were tax competitiveness between the municipalities for the property tax rate of 
2000 and what are the factors that influence this behaviour.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
♦ Chapter 1 : Tax behaviour : tax competition  * 
 
1.1) The Academic Literature 
 
There are two main streams of relevance to the tax behaviour of SNE. The first is the 
academic one that is made up of theoretical articles, often making use of game theory, 
that examine the possible behaviour of SNEs with respect to one another (and to the 
central government) and of a limited number of empirical studies on actual behaviour. 
Examining that literature on SNE tax behaviour, one is struck by the vocabulary used to 
describe it. Perhaps the most common theme is tax competition. This is defined in The 
Encyclopedia of Tax policy as «explicit or implicit». «Governments engage in explicit tax 
competition when they enact tax laws and regulations expressly designed to enhance the 
attractiveness of their jurisdictions to businesses, residents, employees or 
consumers..(and) ..in implicit tax competition when they modify their pursuit of other tax 
policy goals-such as equity, neutrality, simplicity, revenue adequacy, or tax exporting- in 
order to mitigate anti-competitive consequences» (Tannenwald, 1999). Thus tax 
competition is seen as something bad, which is odd given the connotation of good I 
usually associated with competition in economics. In this case, good is associated with 
tax harmonisation which does away with disharmony, something a priori difficult to 
object to. Thereby, one slips from tax competition to tax disharmony with little regard for 
what is meant exactly by harmonisation but with often the notion of uniformity 
synonymous with harmony. For example, Cnossen and Shoup when discussing tax  
 
*This text have been written for Queen’s University 
      
 
 
harmonisation in Europe write that «EC policy makers appear to believe that members 
states should first be forced in the strait-jacket of a uniform tax system»(emphasis ours; 
Cnossen and Shoup, 1977, 82).   
 
According to Wilson and Wildasin there are three definition of tax competition: 
 The broad definition : tax competition seems to be defined very broadly as any 
form of noncooperative tax setting by independent governments. 
 
 The narrower definition : this definition adds the requirement that each 
government’s tax policy influences the allocation of tax revenue across 
government treasuries. 
 
 The narrowest definition : this define tax competition as noncooperative tax 
setting by independent governments, under which each government’s policy 
choices influence the allocation of a mobile tax base among “regions” represented 
by these governments.  In particular, governments may compete over the 
allocation of workers, firms, capital, or shoppers. 
 
 Note that in empirical studies, authors  often do not specify what definition is used. 
 
There are diverse view in the theoretical literature on tax competition.  Oates (1972) 
describes this problem of tax competition as follows “ The result of tax competition may 
well be a tendency toward less than efficient levels of output of local services.  In an 
      
 
 
attempt to keep taxes low to attract business investment, local officials may hold spending 
below those levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particularly for 
those programs that do not offer direct benefits to local business. ”   
 
In fact, local officials will add to the conventional measures of marginal costs with those 
costs such as reduced tax bases, lower wages and employment levels or capital losses on 
homes or other assets that come up from the negative impact of taxation on business 
investment. Those costs will reduce public spending and taxes to levels where the 
marginal benefits equal the higher marginal costs. “ Oates’s conclusion that this 
behaviour is inefficient rests on the idea that when all governments behave this way, none 
gain a competitive advantage, and consequently communities are all worse off than they 
would have been if local officials had simply used the conventional measures of marginal 
costs in their decision rules.”  (Wilson 1999) 
 
“ Since the mid-1980’s, there has been an outpouring of academic research on tax 
competition, and this research continues unabated. Interest in this area has been 
stimulated by highly publicized instance where U.S. states and localities do seem to have 
engaged in tax competition, including the many cases where they have offered large 
subsidies to foreign and domestic automobile companies in an attempt to influence plant 
location decisions.  In addition, researchers and policymakers have found that Oate’s 
(1972) description of tax competition can be applied more broadly to a host of important 
policy concerns, such as competition for investment through weaker environmental 
standards or reductions in welfare payments by states trying to avoid attracting poor 
      
 
 
households.” (Wilson1999)  There are diverse views about intergovernmental 
competition but the main one is that competition is wasteful, that is induce lots of 
questions about the role of the government and their appropriate behaviour and choices. 
However, this is not the view of Tiebout.  Indeed,  Tiebout (1956) argues that 
competition for mobile households is welfare enhancing and in the “Tiebout Hypothesis” 
there is free factor mobility and enable national governments to function independently in 
most policy areas. 
 
In fact, the “Tiebout Hypothesis” is a theory of efficient tax competition and it leads to an 
efficient provision of local public goods. “In modern formulations of the theory, it is 
often assumed that each region’s government is controlled by its landowners, who seek to 
maximize the after-tax value of the region’s land by attracting individuals to reside on 
this land. To do so, the government offers public goods that are financed by local taxes.” 
(Wilson1999) It indicates that there is tax competition since the region wants to attract 
the persons or  keep their residents providing the public goods at a low level of taxes.  
The taxes are collected so that each resident pays a total amount equal to the cost of the 
public goods consumed.  With this marginal-cost-pricing rule each resident makes an 
efficient decision about the choice of the region where they will live. Although these 
results to apply to household mobility some authors such as Fischel (1975) and White 
(1975) have extended them to mobile firm.  They assume that firms are in infinitely 
elastic supply to any given region.  In equilibrium,  the firms are taxed at a rate equal to 
the cost of providing their “public inputs”,  the marginal cost.  
 
      
 
 
In fact, there are diverse views in the theoretical literature of tax competition and that is 
the reason why most authors carry out empirical studies on actual behaviour.  Studies 
have been done on countries, districts, cantons and  municipalities  to measure tax 
competition, its effect and consequences.  One strand of literature reviewed by 
Tannenwald is location studies. He notes that «hundreds of empirical studies have 
investigated the extent to which a jurisdiction’s tax characteristics influence its 
attractiveness. Most studies conclude that (1) taxes are a less powerful determinant of 
business location and expansion than centrality of location, wage rates, regulatory burden 
and the availability of appropriately skilled labour; and (2) ..taxes are a more effective 
instrument of intrametropolitan competition than of intermetropolitan or interstate 
competition.»(1999,p367); two points should be made here. First, location is one choice 
and choice of jurisdiction were income, particularly capital income and corporate profits, 
are reported is another. Second, distances in North America and in Europe are not the 
same; what is inter state in North America may well be inter-country in Europe and intra 
metropolitan, interstate. 
 
A second strand of literature examines the impact of tax diversity either on tax related 
choices of taxpayers or on the behaviour of governments (tax externalities). Five recent 
studies(1993-) are summarised in the Table 1. 
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Table 1 : Empirical Evidence on Tax Mobility/Reaction in sub-national Countries, 1992-2002 
Authors/year of 
study 
Country/Units/Years 
examined 
Number/Nature of 
observations 
Methodology Used Main results Comments 
Case, Rosen and 
Hines, 1993 
U.S./ Continental 
United States/ 
1970-1985 
768 points data; 
48states x 16years 
First, a regression analysis is done  by OLS with state 
public expenditures as DV and real per capita income, 
income squared, real per capita total federal grants to state 
and local governments, population density, proportion of 
the population at least 65 years old, proportion of the 
population between 5 and 17 years old, proportion of the 
population that is black as IV. After, they added three 
neighbor’s exogenous variable at the same regression; 
geographik proximity, per capita income and proportion 
black.  Second, They estimated the model separately for 
four different types of expenditures: health and human 
services, administration, highways and education (equal to 
75% of total expenditure). They used the same DV and IV 
but they used only the proportion black as neighbor’s 
exogenous variable.  
The states’s expenditure are indeed 
significatly influenced by their neighbors. 
When we take in account neighbor effects 
substantially changes the estimed impacts 
of various conditionning variables on 
state expenditure. In addition, we note 
that spillovers need not be confined to 
subfederal jurisdictions but also to 
national governments. 
The impact  effect of a dollar of 
increased spending by a state’s 
neighbors increases its own spending 
by about 70 cents.  
Kirchgasnner et 
Pommerehne, 
1996 
Switzerland/Canton
s/1987 
156 cantonal-
income groups 
share of 
taxpayers(26x7) 
Regression analysis with share of taxpayers in group I as 
DV and PIT rate pre income group, % labour force in 
services, population, infrastructure index, and dummies for 
Zug and Geneva as IV 
Tax rates play a significant role in 
determining where the highest income 
groups choose to locate particularly the 
highest. Infrastructure also plays a role 
Income groups are 0-19(omitted),20-
25,25-50,50-100,100-200 and >200 
CHF 
Regression is weighted with square 
root of population 
Besley et Rosen, 
1998 
USA/48 continental 
states/1975-1989 
720 state tax rates 
on tobacco and on 
gasoline =1440 
Regression analysis with state tax rates as DV and IV: 
federal tax rate, national GDP and unemployment rate, 
state population, income and unemployment rate, %s 
population aged  5-17 and 65+, state production of tobacco 
and gasoline as %s state income,, federal grants per capita, 
federal income /AGI, Democrat governor, %s House and 
Senate democratic, Federal deficit/GDP, state effects 
State tobacco tax increases by .028$ for a 
federal tax increase of .1$; for gasoline 
tax, the increase is .041$. 
An increase in the size of the relevant 
industry decreases the tax rate in a given 
state.  
Taking into account general sales taxes 
does not change the results. Vertical 
externalities are thus present 
Hayashi et 
Boadway 2000 
Canada/Federal, 
Ontario, Quebec 
and aggregate of 
remaining eight 
provinces 
1961-1995 
34 X4 =136 
average effective 
tax rates(taxes 
paid/corporate 
profits) 
Regression with each tax rate as DV; IV are the 3 other tax 
rates, national inflation and utilisation rate, provincial or 
Canadian GDP growth rate, interest rate, per capita wages, 
political party in power, deficit/GDP 
Provincial tax rates of Quebec and 8 
other provinces are diminished when the 
federal one is increased; an increase in 
the Ontario rate has a positive impact on 
the federal one; Ontario does not react to 
changes in provincial rates while Quebec 
reacts positively to an increase in the 
Ontario rate.  
Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
system is estimated by GLS. Reaction 
lag is assumed to be one-period(one 
year) 
The results show that vertical and 
horizontal externalities exist. 
Mintz and Smart 
2001 
Canada/ aggregated 
corporate tax 
returns, 1986-1999 
3509 data point ;14 
years X6 
regionsX7 
industrial sectors X 
6tax and size 
groupings(minus 
19 missing data 
points) 
Regression analysis with ln real taxable income per capita 
as DV and tax rate ,ln income prices , fixed effects and 
interactive province-industry variables as IV 
Regressions are for three types of firms: 
(1)corporations that can shift taxable 
income easily versus those that cannot(2 
and 3) results show a much higher tax 
elasticity for group (1) than (2) or (3) 
The elasticity of 4.3 shows that a 1% 
point reduction in the mean tax 
rate(.43) increases taxable income 
by7.5%.No $ estimate of this impact is 
given; 
DV: dependent variables; IV: independent variables Q for income quartile, (1 lowest, 5 highest                                        
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1.2) The Policy Literature 
 
The second type of literature is more oriented towards policy, although it relies on some of 
the theoretical literature. It addresses the practical problems faced by countries that over the 
last 50 years have seen their borders become more and more open to flows of goods, services, 
capital and labour. It thus focuses on the behaviour of national governments (NGs) that are 
either the members of the European Union or members of the OECD ( Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) or interact as a tax haven with such a government. 
One should note here that until now, it has been common in the literature to draw lessons 
from federal states for the EU; yet, in some respects, the EU is a federal state, with a stronger 
central government than in true federal states. Thus, it may be time to ask what lessons the 
EU has for federal countries. In this case, one sees the emergence of the concepts of «harmful 
tax competition» defined below; 
 
Harmful Tax Competition 
No or Low Nominal Effective Tax Rate (generally or in special circumstances) 
+ 
One or more of: 
• Lack of Effective Exchange of Information; 
• Lack of transparency; 
• Ring fencing of domestic sector or attraction of investment without substantial activities 
Source: (Horner, 2000): 
 
The key issue is the lack of information allowing the country of residence of the owner of an 
income stream the opportunity to levy the appropriate tax burden; this is embodied in 
      
 
 
predatory tax practice. Reading on recent attempts (1997-2001) to harmonise taxation of 
income in the EU (Cattoir and Mors, 2001), one finds similar preoccupations.  
 
We believe that the proper question is not “what is the appropriate degree of tax 
competition?” or “what is the required degree of tax harmonisation?” But rather; what are the 
appropriate tax choices of a given set of SNEs? This requires that criteria be set out and facts 
examined for each set of SNEs  In particular, this means that we recognise that «since every 
country both is unique and in some sense constitutes an organic unity, the significance of any 
particular component of its federal finance system may be understood only in the context of 
the system as a whole» (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998, p34-35). 
 
Hence, what is proper SNE behaviour?  The answer to this question will depend on each 
country. That said, one can note as Cattoir and Vaillancourt did (2002) that : 
 
• One should distinguish between behaviour that influences real decisions, for instance the 
location or expansion of production units (manufacturing plants, call centers,..) and 
financial decisions, such as were to hold saving bonds and bank accounts. The first have 
meaningful economic consequences and revenue impacts while the second only have 
revenue consequences; 
 
• Behaviour that influences financial decisions by individuals, for example, more or less 
strict banking secrecy laws and non communication of relevant tax information to the tax 
authority of the country of residence encourages tax avoidance and tax evasion. Clearly, 
all countries, federal or not, can suffer from the behaviour of third parties tax havens. 
Comparing the EU, a quasi-federal system to federations like Canada and the USA, one 
      
 
 
notes that intra federal tax secrecy and tax residence issues matter more within the EU 
than within federal states. It is appropriate to combat this type of behaviour; 
 
• Behaviour that influences real decisions is much less reprehensible. For example, if some 
SNEs have less mobile populations than others, for language reasons for example, they 
may want to lower the taxation of job creating investments to attract complementary 
capital to their (relative) excess labour. The other option, out-migration to where the 
capital is could well result in linguistic assimilation. This means ,in the absence of natural 
resource rents, that the residents of this SNE will have lower levels of public services or 
higher personal taxes ,or both; 
 
• If an SNE has an exportable tax, such as natural resource rents, why should it not use it to 
make its residents better off? This will lower the tax price of a given supply of public 
services or increase the supply of such services. This will create disparities that a higher 
level of government can chose or not to correct in part or in total. That said, we would 
agree that natural resource rents should be collected by the central government which 
would do away with this issue; 
 
• The fact that the behaviour of one SNE will influence that of other SNEs within a  country 
or that of the central government, in terms of the setting of tax rates, is not a well-founded 
reason as such to prohibit such behaviour. The behaviour of one business unit often has 
impacts on that of others( prices, quantities), yet we leave it free to act. 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
1.3) Consequences and Importance of Tax Competition 
 
Now, we can draw on this existing body of work to examine two issues.  First, the tax 
competition can have bad or good aspects.  Second, in spite of the consequences of 
competition there is evidence of the importance of this tax competition in countries. 
 
First, some people maintain that tax competition is bad because it leads to lower tax rates on 
capital and public expenditure levels and reduces welfare.  This is the view of Oates (1972), 
of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) (Wilson-Wildasin). Whereas, some 
people like Brennan and Buchanan (1980) (Wilson-Wildasin) believe that tax competition can 
be beneficial.  Hence we now examine the bad and good aspects of tax competition.   
 
1.3.1 ) Tax competition; why is it bad  
 
There are various approaches to why tax competition is seen as bad. A first explanation is 
that, implicitly at least, the model of federalism used in the analysis is that of fiscal federalism 
and not of federal finance (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). In the fiscal federalism view of the 
world, one is decentralising responsibilities and revenues, with the norm being the centralised 
solution. Hence, one minimises distortion with respect to a centralised country with uniform 
taxation as very few countries make any significant use of regionally differentiated central 
income (personal or corporate) and consumption taxation as proposed by Buchanan (1950). In 
the federal finance view, one starts from a decentralised perspective where non uniformity is 
the norm and movement towards uniformisation are seen as having both costs and benefits 
that have to be traded –off against one another. In some sense, the issue is what is the default 
position for a federal country that is no longer federal; a centralised one or a set of new 
countries? 
      
 
 
A second explanation draws on a combination of international economics and game theory. It 
defines good or bad not from a national perspective but from an international one. With such 
a perspective, well-conceived co-operation is usually preferable to non-co-operation. Tax 
competition will be seen as harmful if there are externalities associated with the tax policy 
choices of a national government considering when the policy choices are made. This leads to 
a larger definition of tax competition compared to the narrow legal one used by the EU and 
OECD. 
 
One list of reasons why tax competition is bad is put forward by Tannenwald (1999,p370) and 
contains four elements: 
 
• State and local tax incentives reward firms for behavior they would have exhibited any 
way; 
• Tax competition ultimately lowers revenues  without enhancing competitive standing and 
thus lowers spending for needed services; 
• Tax incentives confer windfall in a capricious pattern, distorting the inter-industry 
allocation of resources; 
• Tax competition discourages progressive taxation by sub-national governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Other authors associate three tax issues with fiscal competition. Boadway (2001) conveniently 
summarizes them as follows: 
 
• Fiscal Inefficiency: this results from the fact that some regions have larger tax capacities 
than others, either on residence –based taxes (income,..) or on source –based taxes 
(natural resources,..) with the later capable of tax exportation  and from the fact that some 
regions have larger needs (demography, topography,..) than others. In a unitary tax 
system, this is not apparent but emerges when there is decentralization. As a result, Net 
Fiscal Benefits( value of publicly provided goods ,services and transfers minus taxes paid) 
vary between regions ,creating an incentive to migrate and thus an inefficient allocation of 
resources between the regions of a given country; 
 
• Horizontal Fiscal Externalities: this results from the fact that the tax choices of one region 
have an impact on another region. One distinguishes between positive and negative tax 
externalities. Positive externalities result from too low a tax rate in beggar thy neighbor 
type policies or too high a tax rate that reduces the tax base. Negative externalities result 
from tax exportation with a tax levied by one region being paid by the residents of 
another; 
 
• Vertical Fiscal Externalities: this results from the interaction between the central level of 
government and SNEs. An increase in the tax rate of one level of government can have an 
effect on the tax revenues and /or tax rate(s) of the other level of government. 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Also, the result that emerges from the framework developed by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986) is that it lowers government spending and taxes below their efficient 
levels. Hoyt (1991), shows that in the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model (model of horizontal tax 
competition) the equilibrium capital tax, and welfare, falls as the number of regions rises. 
(Wilson-Wildasin 2001)    
 
 
1.3.2) Tax competition; why is it bad and good  
 
According to Musgrave (1997), tax competition can be good or bad depending on  what type 
of competition one observes. The competition will be good for a jurisdiction if competition 
provides the right services at low cost and helps at designing efficient and equitable tax 
systems. In addition, decentralization with multiple jurisdictions supports this process at the 
local level. Whereas, if the jurisdiction offers low tax rates to attract capital and high income 
residents, in the long run the public services will be at an inefficient level and the use of 
capital will be less efficient. Indeed, Janeba (1998) combines competition over strategic trade 
policies with tax competition and conclude that tax competition leads to higher  taxes or 
subsidies on mobile factors or firms. (Wilson and Wildasin ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
1.3.3 )  Tax competition; why is it good 
 
The first authors to express the hypothesis that the tax competition is good is Tiebout in 1956 
as mentioned above.  The “Tiebout hypothesis ” was that the households choose the 
jurisdictions according to their preferences about taxes and public expenditure.  Therefore,  
competition among jurisdictions leads to an efficient local public good provision and 
consequently to an efficient tax competition. 
 
The most provocative one is provided by Frey and Eichenberger (1996). They argue that the 
construct of a «social welfare maximising government . . . implicitly assuming democracy to 
work so well that no political distortions arise»(p339) is wrong. They note that the importance 
given to the approach reflects the small role played in the tax policy field by public choice 
theory. This theory argues that governments are not necessarily welfare maximising; 
politicians and/or bureaucrats that use them to their own benefits may capture the institutions 
of the state. This usually leads them to seek a greater level of government spending and thus a 
greater level of taxation. And since «harmonisation of taxes is an effective means to raise the 
tax level..»(p340), it is often a policy goal. The authors conclude by noting that:«societies 
face two kinds of distortions that reduce the welfare of individuals: economic distortions are 
induced by differential taxation and political distortions are induced by harmonized taxes. . . 
while the possibilities for reducing economic distortions have been extensively discussed in 
the literature, reducing political distortions has received less attention (347). Thus self-interest 
leads to the promotion of harmony/uniformisation. 
 
      
 
 
Recently, most authors give attention to the possibility of tax competition can be beneficial.  
In fact, they argue that tax competition can lead to higher public expenditures and taxes on 
mobile factors and it could enhanced the efficience of tax competition. 
 
Wilson (1999) points out that Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that tax competition 
improves welfare, because the size of government would be excessive in the absence of this 
competition. 
 
More recently, Janeba et Schjelderup (nd) conclude that the political economy branch of the 
tax competition literature has a favorable outlook on tax competition which is seen as an 
instrument for curbing the rent seeking activities of government officials. 
 
 
Thus, tax freedom can have good effects.  
 
Tannenwald (1999,370) present a list of four items. They are: 
 
• A reduction of the exploitation of taxpayers by leviathan; 
• Encouragement to use the benefit principle which increases the efficiency of taxation;   
• Increased efficiency resulting from using the benefit principle; 
• Encouragement of progressive taxation at the federal level where it is more appropriate 
 
From a fiscal federalism perspective, the main argument to give SNEs freedom in setting their 
own taxes is that at the margin, one wants to make them accountable for their spending by 
requiring them to fund it from their own additional funds and not from transfer revenues.  
      
 
 
Secondly, tax competition has many consequences.  In fact, wasteful fiscal competition  
produce interregional externalities. Indeed, there is the fiscal externality that Boadway 
mentions.  Another type of externality is the “pecuniary externality” that exists when regions 
are large enough to affect the product or factor prices confronting other regions and other 
externality could arise as a result of inefficiencies in private markets, coupled with the failure 
of governments to correct them.(Wilson 1999) In fact, when the governments doesn’t make 
the policy choice in the best interest of its residents, most of consequences can be emerge 
such as these externalities. 
 
However, Wilson and Wildasin (2001) argue that “despite the ineffiencies associated with 
different tax rates, however, a tax harmonization policy without lump-sum transfers between 
regions will not necessarily make both regions better off, because it removes the ability of 
small regions to exploit large regions by undercutting their taxes” in the case of different 
regional size with different tax rates. 
 
1.3.4 ) Tax competition and the locational decisions of multinational firms 
 
 
Since 1980’s, numerous studies have been carried out to know what the effects of taxes are on 
economic development.  The authors have attempted to determine whether taxes or other 
variables play a significant role in the decisions of the firms location.  We can divide the 
different studies in two categories.  The first one includes studies which examine the factors 
that influence the locational decisions of multinational firms.  The second one includes studies 
which examine the same factors in cities, cantons, districts, state or provinces.  We begin with 
two studies that have been done on multinational firms and their locational decisions. 
 
      
 
 
In 1998, Devereux and Griffith examined the factors that influence locational decisions.  They 
used a model in which firms produce differentiated products in imperfectly competitive 
markets and applied it to a panel of US firms locating in the European market.  The results of 
the study is that agglomeration effects are important and the effective average tax rate 
influence the choice of location, but not the choice of whether to locate production in Europe 
compared with one of the outside options.  The second study is Altshuler and Grubert  (2001) 
examined how «the location decisions of US multinational corporations may change if the US 
were to adopt a system that exempts foreign dividends from home taxation.» (Altshuler and 
Grubert 2001) and provides no consistent or definitive evidence that location decisions would 
be significantly changed if dividends were to be exempt to be from US corporate tax.  
 
As mentioned above, the second categories of studies examine the influence of a few factors 
on business location decisions for state, cities or cantons.  In 1996, Robert Tannenwald wrote 
a paper in the New England Economic Review for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on « 
State business tax climate : How should it be measured and how important is it? ».  In this 
paper, he investigated investments by manufacturing companies.  He evaluated the business 
tax climates of 22 states in 1991 for five industries.  Tannenwald analysed also if other factors 
than taxation such as wages, energy cost, the quality of public services and labour 
productivity can affect the location of business fixed investment. This study found a small 
effect that was statistically insignificant for the impact of state and local tax burden on 
business’s capital spending.  
 
Since the last 30 years ago, many authors examined the impact of taxation on economic 
development.  The results show small or no effect on locational decisions of firms.  This is 
      
 
 
maybe why in the last ten years few authors wrote on the subject.  In fact, the majority of 
studies we done before 1990. 
 
1.4 ) Conclusion  
 
SNEs have varied degrees of freedom in setting their tax rates, defining their tax bases and 
administering their tax collection. This freedom is rated the highest amongst some of the 
richest and oldest federations of the world. While this observation should caution us against 
restricting  it unduly, it must be coupled with the fact that in the case of Canada and the USA, 
physical distance may reduce the impact of such differences. Smaller distances in Europe, 
which do not appear to be compensated for by linguistic heterogeneity, make the issue more 
salient there. 
 
While referring to the literature Janeba and Schelderup (nd), they conclude that;  
“Early theory predicts that competition among regions over scarce capital will bid down taxes 
and expenditure to suboptimal levels.  Later contributions have refined the analysis of tax 
competition to the extent that some models predict that taxes may actually increase as 
competition intensifies.  The political economy branch of the tax competition literature has a 
favourable outlook on tax competition, which is seen as an instrument for curbing the rent 
seeking activities of government officials.  Assuming that tax competition leads to 
inefficiently low taxes on capital and reduces welfare, tax coordination among a group of 
countries may improve welfare under certain conditions.” 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
♦ Chapter 2 : Taxation system in Quebec and analysis of studies of tax     
mimicking 
 
2.1) Taxation system for property taxes in Quebec * 
 
In each province of Canada local government impose real property taxes and other property-
based taxes; those taxes are the most important source of municipal revenue. (Finances of the 
nation 2002) 
 
Property taxes are paid by the owners of real property, and on some measure of its value.  The 
tax rate is expressed in dollars by 100$ of value (or 1000$ -the mill rate).  For instance, the 
tax rate for Montreal is 1,99 in 2000, thus for each 100$ of taxable property, the taxpayers 
will paid 1,99$.   These taxes are used to raise funds is local and regional municipal 
governments, school authorities and the provincial governments. (Finances of the nation 
2002) 
 
Real property is defined as the land and things permanently attached to the land.  All 
provinces include land and building in their definitions of real property but some difference 
are present between provinces in the treatment of oil and gas wells, pipeline, mines, public-
utility distribution systems and railways. (Finances of the nation 2002) 
 
 
 
*Finance of the nation 2002, www.acef.ca/FN2002/chap06.pdf 
 
      
 
 
In Québec, real property is defined as «all immovables not explicitly excluded from the 
assessment rolls.  It includes land, buildings, and machinery and equipment that service 
buildings ( for example, elevators and furnaces).   Other taxable immovables include wharves, 
machinery foundations, tanks, chimneys, and handling systems.  The definition excludes 
antipollution equipment, minerals, underground improvements at mine sites, railway property 
other than land and buildings, and immovables of natural gas, electricity, and 
telecommunication distribution systems that are subject to a special tax scheme in lieu of 
property taxes.» (Finances of the nation 2002, p 6:5).   
 
«More recently, since January 1 in 2000, Québec municipalities are allowed to set five 
different tax rates for the following categories; industrial immovables, other non-residential 
immovables, immovables consisting of six or more dwellings, other residential immovables, 
and serviced vacant land.» (Finances of the nation 2002, p 6:12) 
 
 
2.2) Former empirical study 
 
We present empirical studies of the mimicking behaviour in Table 2 which summarizes the 
studies for the 1992- 2002 period.  We resume seven studies but we mainly use four of them. 
 
Ladd, in 1992, concluded that the burden of total taxes and the property tax burden increase if 
the neighbours’ taxes increased.  Indeed, in 1978 when a neighbours tax increase of one dollar 
she reported an increase of 0.59$ for the burden of total taxes and 0.45$ for the property tax 
burden in their own tax rates and in 1985 we have  increases of 0.82$ and 0.58$ respectively.  
Revelli (2001) concluded that a 10% increase in the local property tax rate of a district’s 
neighbours leads to an increase of 4-5% in its own property tax rate.  Ladd’s study is different 
      
 
 
from the other studies because it compares for 1978 and for 1985 the degree of clustering of 
tax burden among neighbouring counties within metropolitan areas to that among 
nonneighbouring counties within states with coefficient of variation.  In fact, she examine if a 
county’s tax burden will have more impact on neighbouring counties within metropolitan 
areas than nonneighbouring counties within states. 
 
 
      
 
 
Authors/ 
year of study 
Country/Units/ 
Years examined 
Number/Nature 
of observations 
Methodology Used Main results Comments 
Ladd, 1992 USA/ 248 large 
counties or county/ 
1978 and 1985 
496 points data ; 
248 x 2 years 
First, she did a comparison for 1978 and 1985 for  
the degree of clustering of tax burden among 
neighbouring counties within metropolitan areas to 
that among nonneighbouring counties within states 
with coefficient of variation.  Secondly, the 
regression (with instrumental variables)  are 
estimed separately for 1978 and 1985 data . The 
IV is local tax burden with  DV : total taxes, 
property taxes, residential property taxes, general 
sales taxes, other taxes. 
The local tax decisions in one 
jurisdiction are influenced by the tax 
burdens in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
For example, in the regression, if 
the burden of total  taxes on a 
county’s neighbors increase by 
1$per 100$ of income, the burden 
in the county will increase by 
0,59$ per 100$ in 1978 and the 
property tax burden by 0,45$. 
While in 1985 they increased by 
0,82$ and 0,58$ respectively. 
Some of these differences may be 
explained by the nationwide “tax 
revolt”” of the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s. 
Heydels and 
Vuchelen,1998 
Belgium/municipal
ities/1991 
589 Local income 
tax (LIT)and local 
property tax 
(LPT)choices 
3SLS estimations with either LIT or LPT as DV 
and IV: population, per capita income, % 
population <20 and also %>60, area and tax rates 
of neighbours. 
In base equation, impact of Lit is 
increase in neighbour is .67% and in 
LPT .695%.. an increase in population 
increases tax rates while for income, it 
decreases them.  
Additional analysis with income 
endogenous or different treatment 
of neighbours does not change 
results. Impact of neighbours 
diminishes with distance. 
Horizontal externalities are thus 
present 
Brett and 
Pinske ,2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada-Province 
of British 
Columbia/municip
alities/1987 and 
1991 
Business property 
taxes(BPT) for 147 
municipalitiesX2= 
294 
Structural form and reduced form(with IV) 
analysis with BPT as DV and IV: median income 
,own and neighbour; workforce in primary sector, 
own and neighbour; parks and roads per capita, 
distance from Vancouver, ,supra-municipal 
business tax rate and neighbours tax rate. 
There is some evidence of neighbours 
tax rates and supra municipal tax rates 
affecting the choice of tax rates but it 
is not consistent from one estimation 
to another. 
Adding fixed effects to the 
analysis reduces the number of 
significant coefficients 
Revelli, 2001 UK/ English non-
metropolitan 
districts/ 1983-
1990 
2368 points data ; 
296 non-
metropolitan 
districts x 8 years 
Estimation procedure based on an instrumental 
variables approach (generalized method of 
moments) with local tax rate as DV and IV : the 
per capita rateable value, the Block Grant per 
capita, the proportion of domestic local tax rate 
base, the unemployment rate, a political controle 
variable (dummy variable) that equals one if the 
local council is controlled by the Labour Party and 
equals zero otherwise. 
There is two different kinds of 
interaction.  The results have conclued 
the presence of large and significant 
horizontal interaction between UK 
districts, but there is no evidence of 
positive correlation between district 
and county property tax 
rates.Therefore, instead is compatible 
with tax mimicking at the local level. 
A 10% increase in the local 
property tax rate of a district’s 
neighbours leads to an increase of 
4-5% in its own property tax rate. 
Table 2 : Empirical evidence on tax mimicking, 1992-2002 
      
 
 
Brueckner and 
Saavedra, 2001 
U.S./ cities from 
the Boston 
metropolitan area/ 
1980 and 1990 
140 points data ; 
70 cities x 2 years 
Regression analysis ( LM ) with property tax rates 
as DV and per capita income, per capita state aid, 
the African-American proportion of the 
population, the proportion of the adult population 
with at least a college education, public sector 
earnings per capita, annual rate of population 
growth and population as IV. In addition, a IV 
equal to the city’s 1989 tax levy is added for the 
second regression  (1990). 
 
There is a empirical evidence on 
property-tax competition among local 
governments. In 1980 and 1990, there 
is strategic interaction in the choice of 
tax rates. 
The strategic interaction still 
occurs in the post-Proposition 21/ 2  
environment in the choice of 
business property taxes. The  tax 
competition persisted despite the 
restrictions imposed by this tax 
limitation measure. 
Goodspeed, 
2002 
13 OECD 
countries,1975-
1984,Aggregated 
local income tax 
revenues  
130 country/year 
data points 
Regression analysis (Tobit)with local income tax 
rate as DV  and national income tax rate, local 
spending tax base mobility, and disparity, grants 
and fixed effects as IV 
The higher the national tax rate, the 
lower the local one. 
The higher the tax bases disparities 
and the higher Q1, the lower the rate. 
Tax rate is revenue/GDP; 
Disparity is Q5share/Q1share; 
Q1share as mobility. 
Results indicate that vertical and 
horizontal externalities appear to 
occur 
Revelli, 2002 UK/ English non-
metropolitan 
district/ 1990 
296 points data ; 
296 non-
metropolitan 
districts x 1 years 
First, a Moran spatial statistic has been computed 
for the assessed levels of spending per capita, the 
actual levels of spending per capita and the 
property tax rates in 1990. Second, two regression 
by OLS with local public spending and local 
property tax rates as DV with IV; grant from 
central government, population size, a dummy for 
closeness to metropolitan areas to control for the 
presence of externalities form the (excluded) urban 
areas and a political control dummy to allow for 
systematic ideological differences. Third, a 
comparison between regression analysis by LM 
and IV approach with DV and IV. 
The spatial autocorrelation is an 
important feature of local 
governments’ expenditure decisions. 
The results support the hypothesis of 
spatially autocorrelated residuals in the 
local public expenditure determination 
equation and of mimicking behaviour 
in local property tax setting.  
 
DV: dependent variables; IV: independent variables Q for income quartile, (1 lowest, 5 highest )                                                                                                                                                                                                                   11
      
 
 
Secondly, the regression (with instrumental variables)  are estimed separately for 1978 and 
1985 data.  It would be interesting if this study had used as an explanatory variable 
government subsidies in the regression because in other studies like Brueckner et Saavedra 
(2001), per capita state aid is significative.  
 
Heydels and Vuchelen (1998) conclude that there is presence of horizontal externality for a 
study for Belgium in 1991.  The results show that an increase of 10% of the tax rate of a 
neighbour will increase the tax rate of the jurisdiction by 6.95%.  Moreover, the population of 
the municipalities and the proportion of the 60 year old people and more are two significant 
and positive variables and income is a significant and negative variable.  In the study of 
Heydels and Vuchelen (1998) there is an important fact which is raised, it is that they find that 
the impact on the neighbours decreases with distance.  In fact, they estimate coefficients for 
variables such as neighbours of first order and close to second order and the coefficient for 
those second-order is smaller.  This is why, the impact is stronger for jurisdictions which 
share a border. 
 
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), study the cities of the urban area of Boston for 1980 and 
1990 show that there is empirical evidence on property-tax competition among local 
governments. In 1980, the income per capita and the annual growth rate of the population 
have a negative impact on the rate of land tax and the per capita assistance given to the states 
per capita has a positive impact.  In 1990, only the coefficients of the income per capita and 
the assistance given to the states have the same impacts.  However, a new strongly significant 
and positive variable is the levy per capita (lagged).  For the years 1980 and 1990, Brueckner 
and Saavedra observe a strategic interaction in the choice of the tax rates.  This study uses a 
econometric model with spatial lags, estimates a reaction function of the representative 
      
 
 
community, which connects the tax rates on the property of the community to its own 
characteristics and the tax rates of the communities in competition. (Brueckner and Saavedra 
2001)  The goal of their study is to see whether after the proposal 2 ½, which is a restraint 
measure of the tax imposed in 1981, there is still tax  competition.  The study was thus made 
for 1980 and 1990.  However, the study shows that even after this proposal there is still 
strategic interaction in 1990.  Yet, it would have been interesting to see whether with the 
passage of time between 82 and 90 this interaction would have decreased.   
 
More recently, Revelli (2001) concluded that there is a large and significant horizontal 
interaction between UK districts (a entities used for administrative and other purposes) tax 
rates, but there is no evidence of positive correlation between district and county property tax 
rates. In fact, a 10% increase in the local property tax rate of a district’s neighbours leads to 
an increase of 4-5% in its own property tax rate.  Moreover, his study reveals that the 
unemployment rate ( variable use as proxy for the local socio-economic conditions) and 
national grants have a negative impact on the local tax rate and the political variable (dummy 
variable) suggest that the authorities controlled by the Labour Party have higher tax rate than 
the authorities controlled by other parties (Conservative, Liberal Democrats).  However, there 
is a weakness in the study because the unemployment rate variable is a proxy for income.  In 
fact, there is no perfect correlation between income and unemployment rate, thus it would be 
necessary to have a corrected income between the differential of  cost of living for districts to 
correct for this weakness.   
 
Therefore, it is possible to note that some differences are present in these studies.  Certain 
studies were carried out for one year and others for a longer period of time.  Moreover, the 
authors do not use the same explanatory variables.  Indeed, the variables which proved to be 
significant in certain cases were omitted in other studies.  And the fact of taking variables 
      
 
 
such as the rate of unemployment as proxy of the income (Revelli 2001) represents a 
weakness since there is no perfect correlation between these two variables. 
 
However, we can see that in all these cases, there is a «mimicking ».  
 
2.3) Theoretical analysis of our assumption 
 
As noted above several authors have tried to analyse there interactions empirically.  The 
majority of existing empirical studies indicate the presence of horizontal interaction between 
sub-national entities.  These studies have been carried out for UK, United-States, Belgium and 
British–Columbia in Canada.   We will examine if tax mimicking is indeed present in this 
province and in particular for the (CMA)of Montreal. 
 
Hence we assume that the local government of a municipality which increases or decrease its 
property tax rate will incite the local governments of the closest municipalities to do the same 
creating strategic behaviour of the municipalities.  With this approach, it will be thus possible 
to understand the dynamics of the choices of the local governments.  And moreover, this 
study will make it possible to contribute to the general results. 
 
The Montreal CMA was selected to test if there is tax competition since it is the largest urban 
area of Quebec and is composed of more than one hundred municipalities located 
continuously to one another.  The list of all the municipalities as well as the values of the 
variables used for each one of them are found in appendix 1.  Since some of the municipalities 
of Montreal were amalgamated in 2002, we will examine the tax behaviour of the 
municipalities for the year 2000 to avoid any behaviour in 2001 associated until the merger. 
Moreover, the study had to  be done before the merger since after the merger we count only 
      
 
 
28 municipalities.  We will try to establish if the municipalities try to imitate the tax 
behaviour of their neighbour and if certain economic variables such as conditional subsidies 
for the year 2000 which are transfers of the provincial government granted to the 
municipalities, median household income, tax rate and demographic variables such as density 
of population and population influence the tax rate.  We have summarized some statistics for 
our variables in the table 3 and there is also a small geographic map in appendix which 
represent all municipalities of the urban area of Montreal.  
 
Table 3. Summary of statistics 
Note: The data on the population, the density of population and the median income come 
from the census of 2001.  The data on the tax rate and conditional subsidies come from 
http://www.mamsl.gouv.qc.ca/accueil.asp 
  
 
The neighbour’s rate of 1999 is a variable which give an equal importance to the neighbours 
of each municipality.  Hence, if a municipalities has three neighbours, each tax rate of this 
three municipalities will have a proportion of 1/3 in the calculation of the neighbour’s rate of 
1999. 
 
Variables                                            Mean           Median          Standard           Min.            Max. 
                                                                                                      Deviation 
Tax rate 2000 (1$ per 100)                 1,28            1,2545               0,332             0,493            2,296 
Tax rate 1999                                     1,271             1,24                0,3414           0,493            2,301  
Population                                       32630,70        13391           106335,98          893           1039534  
Median household income  ($)       54346,83        52337             14846,62         26317           95347 
Density of population                       1408,02         723,9              1601,40            13,6            7549,3 
Conditional subsidies ($)              2034081,83      361988         12163741,4           0         122911500 
Neighbour’s rate of 1999(Mi tit-1)          1,295           1,249                 0,265             0,816          1,99 
      
 
 
♦ Chapter 3 :  Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 ) Model  
 
We estimate the equation below to establish if there is horizontal interaction between 
municipalities of the urban area of Montreal.  In this equation, index i refers to the 
municipalities (i = 1,…,105), index t refers to the financial year 2000 (t = 2000).   The tax rate 
for the year 2000 is represented by tt, then we have variables such as population, median 
income, density of population and conditional subsidies for the year 2000.  In the equation, 
we have included the tax rate of the  previous year as an explanatory variable.   The error term 
is µ . 
 
Tt = γ + α pop + β income + δ density.pop + τ Mi tit-1 + θ subsidies + µ       
 
The parameter τ measure the horizontal interaction between the municipalities.  The variable 
Mi  is the ith  row of the weight matrix  M (105x105).   To build this matrix a geographical 
criterion was adopted.  The element mij of the matrix will be equal to (1/number of 
neighbourhoods of the municipality i ) if the municipality i and the municipality j share a 
common border  and equal to zero otherwise.  The sum of each row will be equal to one.  This 
matrix is multiplied by the vector of tax rates  with a one year lag thus tt-1 (1999).  If we don’t 
introduce this one year lag, we have a problem of endogeneity because tax rates of the 
municipality and its neighbours will be simultaneously determined.  We have to carry out a 
White test to see if heteroscedasticity is present;  there is heteroscedasticity.  Therefore a 
regression using robust OLS will be carried out.  By these estimates, we will find an 
horizontal interaction if the parameter  τ is statistically significant. 
 
      
 
 
3.2 ) Data and Results 
  
In our equation, our dependent variable is the rate of tax for the year 2000 for the 
municipalities of the urban area of Montreal.  As mentioned above, we have independent 
variables such as the resident population in each one of the cities and their population density, 
median income and conditional subsidies are included in our equation.  
 
The regression will be for the 105 municipalities of the urban area of Montreal for the year 
2000.   Two municipalities of the 107 had to be excluded from our estimate. Dorval island and 
Cadieux island were omitted from our study because of their respective population and the 
median income for Cadieux island was not available.  The results of our estimates of the 
regression by robust OLS are presented in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Table 4. Estimates of model  (by OLS robust )  
 Variables                                                                                                                OLS 
  
Neighbour’rate τ                                                                                                     .391 * 
                                                                                                                               (.109) 
 
Population                                                                                                            1.91e-06*  
                                                                                                                            (9.24e-07) 
 
Median Income                                                                                                   -5.42e-07 
                                                                                                                            (2.23e-06) 
 
Population  density                                                                                             .0000745 * 
                                                                                                                             (.00002) 
 
Conditional subsidies 2000                                                                                 -1.34e-08  
                                                                                                                            (7.77e-09) 
 
constant                                                                                                                   .660 * 
                                                                                                                                (.204) 
 
Number of observations                                                                                           105 
 
R2                                                                                                                           0.4897  
Notes : The dependent variable is the property tax rate of 2000 
The standard deviation are reported in parentheses 
* Significant at a level of 5% 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
The results of table 4 show that the median income of households and the conditional 
subsidies offered to local governments by the provincial government have a negative impact 
on the tax rates.  However, these two variables are not statistically significant.  Population has 
a positive impact on tax rates of 2000 with a estimated coefficient of 1.91e-06 and this 
variable is significant with a t-statistics of 2.073.  Moreover, population density has a positive 
impact on the tax rates with a estimated coefficient of 0.0000745 but this variable is very 
significant with a t-statistic of 3.729.  Therefore, a municipality which  has a high density 
population and a large population will see its tax rate increase compared to another 
municipality which a lower density of population or population. 
 
For the horizontal interaction, the results show that the interaction is very strong between 
municipalities.  In fact, the estimated coefficient is very significant.  The estimated coefficient 
is 0.391 with a t-statistics of 3.603.  This result implies that an increase of 10% of the tax rate 
of a neighbouring municipality leads to an augmentation the tax rate of almost 4% in its own 
tax rate.  Moreover, the R2 of this regression is 0.4897, one can thus say that the model has 
appropriate explanatory variables. 
 
The results reported that are similar to the results obtained in  other empirical studies.  For the 
United States, Ladd (1992) found correlation coefficient between counties’ tax burdens that 
range 0.45 to 0.82.  Heydels and Vuchelen in 1998 found a coefficient for the tax rates in 
neighbouring municipalities of 0.695.  Thus, an increase of 10% for a neighbouring 
municipality leads to an increase of 6.95% in tax rates for it is own municipality.  Revelli in 
2001, found for UK, that an increase of 10% in a local property tax rate of a district’s 
neighbour leads to an increase of 4-5% it is own property tax rate.   
 
      
 
 
The results are compatible with two explanations.  First of all, the relation which exist 
between a municipality and its neighbour municipality can be due to common shocks 
affecting the local government such as a shock on the expenditure of a municipality.  
Secondly, « tax competition among local jurisdictions and the existence of spill-over effects 
from local public expenditure might generate correlation in tax rates among neighbouring 
authorities.» (Revelli, 2001 p.1106).  Thus, this second explanation implies that the tax 
mimicking is a explanation which one must retain.  
 
Revelli (2001) concludes that horizontal interaction exists.  He explains,  why, this spatial 
auto-correlation observed between districts (a region marked off for administrative or other 
purposes) can be due to common shocks which affect only local government.   For instance, 
«an environmental catastrophe (an event most likely to bring about neighbourhood effects) 
might force local authorities to levy higher taxes at the level of government that is responsible 
for environmental health (the district), but not at the upper level of government (the county)». 
(Revelli, 2001 p.1106)  He concludes that the effect of tax mimicking cannot be excluded by 
suggesting that it would be the most plausible cause for the explanation of these results.  He 
excluded with a reasonable degree from confidence the possibility that spatial dependence in 
property tax rates is simply due to the presence of common shocks.(Revelli, 2001p.1106) 
 
In fact, the tax mimicking would be also the most probable cause for the explanation of our 
results.  Indeed, for the years used in this study, no environmental catastrophe, no event which 
could have caused effects on  the neighbour municipalities occurred in the urban area of 
Montreal.  One can only reject assumption concerning the common shocks.  It thus becomes 
obvious that the tax competition would be the most precise interpretation of our results.  
 
      
 
 
A  interesting fact to accentuate is that the tax rate of previous years such as 1998, 1997 and 
so on, have also a impact but it decrease with the years.  Moreover, the population become not 
significant in the last column.  We can observe these results in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Results of regression tax rate of previous years 
   Variables                                      OLS(τ =1999)          OLS (τ =1998)       OLS(τ=1997) 
 Neighbour’rate τ                                     .391 *                     .386 *                     .365*   
                                                                (.109)                     (.111)                      (.122)     
 
Population                                             1.91e-06 *               1.95e-06*              1.88e-06   
                                                             (9.24e-07)               (9.24e-07)             (9.64e-07)     
   
Median Income                                   -5.42e-07                 -5.07e-07               -4.23e-07   
                                                            (2.23e-06)                (2.23e-06)             (2.22e-06)    
 
Density of population                          .0000745 *              .0000746 *            .0000763 *  
                                                             (.00002)                 (.0000202)             (.0000204)  
      
Conditional subsidies 2000                 -1.34e-08                -1.36e-08               -1.30e-08   
                                                             (7.77e-09)              (7.77e-09)             (8.11e-09)      
 
constant                                                 .660 *                        .673 *                   .7155 *  
                                                              (.204)                       (.2035)                  (.2081)         
 
Number of observations                         105                           105                        105 
 
R2                                                            0.4897                    0.4864                    0.4798 
Notes : The dependent variable is property tax rate of 2000 
The standard deviation are reported in parentheses 
* Significant at a level of 5% 
 
      
 
 
♦ Conclusion 
 
This paper used a regression model to examine if was tax competition presente between the 
municipalities of the Montreal CMA.  The results obtained  confirmed, the presence of 
horizontal interaction at the level of local governments.  In fact, when a neighbouring 
municipality increase its tax rate of 10%, a municipality increase its own tax rate by almost 
4%.  Also, among the explanatory variables used only the density of population and the 
population are a significant and positive effect on tax rate.  Moreover, the horizontal 
interaction is not due to common shocks that would affect the local government such as 
environmental catastrophe or a shock on the expenditure of a municipality in particular but 
rather by the behaviour of tax mimicking.  In fact, the local government tend to mimic the 
behaviour of their neighbours for tax rate.  These results support the assumption that there is a 
tax mimicking between the municipalities of the Montreal CMA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Appendix 1 
Table 6: municipalities and values of the variables used in the regression 
        Density of Conditional 
Municipalities Tax rate of  98 Tax rate of 99 Tax rate of 2000 Population Median income 
Population  km 
2 
subsidies 
2000 
Anjou 1,48 1,55 1,55 38015 40828 2791,1 1018492
Baie-d'Urfé 0,9675 1,0419 1,0176 3813 90169 632,5 0
Beaconsfield 1,683 1,721 1,721 19310 88432 1754 575963
Beauharnois 1,63 1,63 1,63 6387 37207 156 634007
Bellefeuille 1,05 1,09 1,13 14066 51482 281,4 195921
Beloeil 1,454 1,4541 1,464 19053 50987 791 381796
Blainville 1,35 1,35 1,35 36029 62619 653,9 337440
Bois-des-Filion 1,0902 1,0902 1,0902 7712 50006 1803,2 582147
Boisbriand 1,095 1,131 1,134 26729 56157 962,8 816143
Boucherville 1,112 1,112 1,112 36253 71991 512,1 361923
Brossard 1,09 1,18 1,14 65026 55008 1421,6 1343414
Candiac 1,177 1,177 1,177 12675 69720 723,9 349581
Carignan 0,8937 0,8937 1,0014 5915 55202 94,8 934560
Chambly 1,2603 1,2797 1,3598 20342 52809 806,2 615764
Charlemagne 1,2872 1,3734 1,3734 5662 38706 2612,5 450931
Châteauguay 1,39 1,39 1,39 41003 50014 1142,4 1025043
Côte-Saint-Luc 1,633 1,677 1,677 30244 41028 4356 615334
Delson 1,21 1,21 1,25 7024 55205 985 165406
Deux-Montagnes 1,448 1,491 1,538 17080 53213 2773,7 1879476
Dollard-des-Ormeaux 1,74 1,9 1,86 48206 62590 3191,9 487087
Dorval 1,5472 1,5809 1,57 17706 48327 848,3 1000089
Gore 0,92 0,95 0,95 1260 30973 13,6 186221
Greenfield Park 1,4066 1,43 1,43 16978 44829 3555,1 409083
Hampstead 2,16 2,2652 2,2552 6974 89076 3895,9 278850
Hudson 0,7874 0,7874 0,9303 4796 58935 220,5 24207
Kirkland 1,5119 1,5119 1,5009 20434 87387 2119,5 220214
L'Assomption 1,1 1,1 1,1 15615 50224 157,9 226814
L'Île-Bizard 1,3871 1,3871 1,3177 13861 73098 608,7 280879
L'Île-Cadieux 0,5645 0,5829 0,5855 127  224 0
L'Île-Dorval 4,09 4,09 4,45 0  0 0
L'Île-Perrot 1,516 1,471 1,43 9375 47809 1686,9 1703364
La Plaine 1,5261 1,5261 1,5655 15673 47672 389,9 1000388
La Prairie 1,0329 1,0237 1,0184 18896 57272 432,5 619749
LaSalle 1,72 1,72 1,67 73983 39655 4417,5 1861081
Lachenaie 1,1544 1,1944 1,1944 21709 62218 516 704267
Lachine 1,43 1,48 1,45 40222 35126 2256 1462983
Lafontaine 0,99 1,04 1,1 9477 40247 659,8 14588
Laval 1,609 1,697 1,6714 343005 49194 1388,3 24276391
Lavaltrie 1,125 1,125 1,127 5967 46853 2123,9 310024
Le Gardeur 1,3693 1,39 1,33 17668 57486 473,9 361988
LeMoyne 1,465 1,465 1,465 4855 30604 4852,6 10210
Les Cèdres 0,8815 0,8965 0,9659 5128 58091 65,4 120003
Longueuil 1,627 1,655 1,683 128016 38344 2909,2 6695279
Lorraine 1,0558 1,0558 1,0774 9476 86889 1568,6 203674
      
 
 
       Density of Conditional 
Municipalities Tax rate of 98 Tax rate of 99 Tax rate of 2000 Population Median income Population km2 
Subsidies 
2000 
Léry 0,493 0,493 0,493 2378 51051 224,9 5168
Maple Grove 0,69 0,69 0,69 2628 45538 309,6 34497
Mascouche 1,4147 1,4196 1,4079 29556 53499 277,2 464363
McMasterville 1,145 1,185 1,185 3984 50390 1284,6 82263
Melocheville 1,0614 1,0614 1,0614 2449 45224 129,6 114567
Mercier 1,0403 1,0486 1,0722 9442 55972 205,5 545704
Mirabel 0,94 0,94 0,94 27330 49061 56,3 577830
Mont-Royal 1,29 1,29 1,29 18682 75473 2438,3 264320
Mont-Saint-Hilaire 0,95 1 1 14270 62153 322,2 860203
Montréal 1,99 1,99 1,99 1039534 31771 5590,8 122911500
Montréal-Est 1,53 1,56 1,56 3547 38142 284,8 656943
Montréal-Nord 1,75 1,72 1,72 83600 27529 7549,3 401562
Montréal-Ouest 2,2553 2,3012 2,2956 5172 88209 3675,4 0
Notre-Dame-de-l'Île-Perrot 0,9092 0,9267 0,9267 8546 71383 307,5 157362
Oka 1,23 1,28 0,97 3194 51809 53 230454
Otterburn Park 1,215 1,265 1,315 7866 56499 1470,9 576023
Outremont 1,375 1,54 1,54 22933 61979 5984,3 1949106
Pierrefonds 2,12 2,12 1,965 54963 52337 2207,2 423940
Pincourt 1,5738 1,6246 1,5828 10107 60546 1340 114157
Pointe-Calumet 1,09 1,09 1,09 5604 39710 1211,2 23995
Pointe-Claire 1,447 1,4679 1,4679 29286 61133 1552,2 601650
Pointe-des-Cascades 1,15 1,15 1,15 913 58224 327,6 181633
Repentigny 1,21 1,21 1,21 54550 58110 2228 1603410
Richelieu 1,075 1,075 1,075 4851 45142 156,3 87581
Rosemère 0,81 0,88 0,825 13391 74708 1243 618314
Roxboro 1,8718 1,84 1,812 5642 58881 2544,4 157086
Saint-Amable 1,0954 1,2213 1,4025 7278 44365 198,4 348808
Saint-Antoine 1,48 1,47 1,45 11488 42358 1156,9 137753
Saint-Antoine-de-Lavaltrie 0,9916 0,9615 0,9914 5196 47288 79,5 10980
Saint-Basile-le-Grand 1,179 1,179 1,179 12385 62390 343,1 326846
Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville 0,8575 0,8675 0,8775 23843 69290 551 1573568
Saint-Colomban 1,0698 1,1331 1,1309 7520 48097 80,4 577830
Saint-Constant 1,128 1,206 1,2416 22577 60031 394 428015
Saint-Eustache 1,422 1,407 1,35 40378 49913 581,6 1452800
Saint-Hubert 1,438 1,435 1,444 75912 51810 1150,6 1131649
Saint-Isidore 0,79 0,79 0,79 2371 47153 45,6 49490
Saint-Joseph-du-Lac 1,2252 1,205 1,2545 4882 58059 118 8628
Saint-Jérôme 1,45 1,57 1,64 24583 26317 1514,8 1474232
Saint-Lambert 1,29 1,29 1,29 21051 53928 2584 1354020
Saint-Laurent 1,38 1,38 1,38 77391 39412 1804,7 2331927
Saint-Lazare 0,674 0,674 0,708 12895 76091 193,8 1644709
Saint-Léonard 1,7569 1,7569 1,7569 69604 38328 5149 884100
Saint-Mathias-sur-Richelieu 0,9181 0,918 0,9181 4149 53568 87,9 267903
Saint-Mathieu 0,862 0,862 0,862 1961 45253 62,1 10492
Saint-Mathieu-de-Beloeil 0,766 0,766 0,7743 2236 68709 56,1 219717
Saint-Philippe 0,9382 0,94 0,9391 3892 48544 62,6 134543
Saint-Placide 1,0391 1,0408 1,04 1537 29691 35,6 116359
      
 
 
        Density Conditional 
Municipalities Tax rate of 98 Tax rate of 99 Tax rate of 2000 Population Median income Population km2 
Subsidies 
2000 
Saint-Sulpice 0,28 0,54 0,6007 3343 54821 91,9 6175
Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue 1,2622 1,3002 1,2999 5062 44092 479 161161
Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines 1,24 1,24 1,295 12908 47271 139,1 225586
Sainte-Catherine 1,0738 1,0542 1,0821 15953 55103 1565,6 143729
Sainte-Geneviève 1,585 1,625 1,625 3278 34427 3816,1 12400
Sainte-Julie 1,047 1,05 1,059 26580 69082 536,7 760696
Sainte-Marthe-sur-le-Lac 1,387 1,387 1,5026 8742 47816 938,6 216207
Sainte-Thérèse 1,19 1,29 1,3 24269 40388 2533,9 1210648
Senneville 1,0138 1,0818 1,081 970 95347 129,6 1190
Terrasse-Vaudreuil 1,2739 1,2616 1,2432 2047 54121 1977,2 5823
Terrebonne 1,1254 1,3276 1,3276 43149 48723 598 1068492
Varennes 0,662 0,766 0,746 19653 66703 212,4 273549
Vaudreuil-Dorion 1,03 1,05 1,155 19920 54728 274,9 4416476
Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac 0,8606 0,8814 0,8815 893 81258 650,5 9720
Verdun 1,52 1,5201 1,54 60564 35176 6166 1957958
Westmount 1,35 1,35 1,35 19727 78611 4902,8 240008
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